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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
V.

ROBERTO MANUEL ROJAS,
Defendant-Appellant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

NOS. 47552-2019 & 47585-2019
ADA COUNTY NOS. CR0l-19-31772 &
CR0l-19-25847
APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Roberto Manuel Rojas pied guilty to Eluding a Peace Officer ("eluding") and Operating a
Motor Vehicle Under The Influence Of Drugs ("DUI") in three consolidated cases. He was
sentenced to a unified term of five years, with two years fixed, on the eluding charge; and 180
days fixed on the DUI charge. In this consolidated appeal, Mr. Rojas argues the district court
abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence.
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Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
Mr. Rojas was arrested after a high-speed chase and charged with eluding. (R., pp.6-7.) 1
Additional eluding and DUI charges were brought in a separate case. (47585 pp.7-8.) A
magistrate judge found no probable cause to support the second eluding charge after a
preliminary hearing and did not bind Mr. Rojas over on that allegation. (47585 R., p.13.) Those
cases were then consolidated. (R., pp.12-13.)2 An Information was then filed charging Mr. Rojas
with eluding. (R., pp.18-19.)
A plea agreement was then reached where Mr. Rojas pled guilty to the eluding and DUI
charges, in exchange for the State dropping the third case, not filing an Information Part II, and
recommending imposition of a five-year sentence, with two years fixed, on the eluding charge.
(R., pp.33-34.) There was no specific agreement regarding a sentence for the DUI charge.
(Tr., p.5, Ls.15-16.)
At sentencing, the State made the sentence recommendation required in the plea
agreement. (Tr., p.19, Ls.4-18.) Mr. Rojas asked the court to either retain jurisdiction or "to
consider an imposed sentence of one plus four." (Tr., p.20, Ls.13-17.) On the DUI charge, the
court imposed a sentence of 180 days, with credit for 175 days served. (Tr., p.24, Ls.9-17;
R., p.36.) The court then imposed a sentence of five years, with two years fixed, on the eluding
charge. (Tr., p.25, Ls.1-2.)
Mr. Rojas timely appealed from the Judgment of Conviction. (R., pp.42-43.)
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Citations to the Record will be to the Clerk's Record in Docket 47552, except where otherwise
indicated by the Docket number.
2
A third case, CR0l-19-18385, was also included in the consolidation order. (See R., pp.12-13.)
However, that case was dismissed as part of Mr. Rojas's guilty plea. (See R., p.33.)
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ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a unified sentence of five years, with
two years fixed, upon Mr. Rojas following his plea of guilty to eluding and DUI?

ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed A Unified Sentence Of Five Years,
With Two Years Fixed, Upon Mr. Rojas Following His Pleas Of Guilty To Eluding And DUI

A.

Introduction
Mr. Rojas asserts that, given any view of the facts, his unified sentence of five years, with

two years fixed, is excessive. Specifically, he asserts that the district court abused its discretion
by not adequately considering mitigating evidence.

B.

Standard Of Review
A court's decisions at sentencing are generally reviewed for an abuse of discretion.

State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 567 (Ct. App. 1982) (The Idaho "Supreme Court has applied a
general standard of 'clear abuse of discretion' to appellate review of sentencing decisions.")
(quoting State v. Ogata, 95 Idaho 309, 508 P.2d 141, 143 (1973)). The Idaho Supreme Court has
held that, "' [w ]here a sentence is within statutory limits, an appellant has the burden of showing
a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the court imposing the sentence."' State v. Jackson, 130
Idaho 293, 294 (1997) (quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 577 (1979)). Because Mr. Rojas
does not allege that his sentence exceeds the statutory maximum, in order to show an abuse of
discretion he must show that in light of the governing criteria, the sentence was excessive
considering any view of the facts. Jackson, 130 Idaho at 294.
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When this Court reviews an alleged abuse of discretion by a trial court the
sequence of inquiry requires consideration of four essentials. Whether the trial
court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the
outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards
applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by
the exercise of reason.
Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863 (2018) (emphasis in original). "However, in
exercising that discretion, reasonableness is a fundamental requirement." State v. Nice, I 03 Idaho
89, 90 (1982) (citing State v. Dillon, 100 Idaho 723, 724 (1979)).
When a sentence is reviewed, the reviewing court will "consider the defendant's entire
sentence." State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726 (2007). Where a defendant contends that the
sentencing court imposed an excessively harsh sentence, the appellate court will conduct an
independent review of the record considering the nature of the offense, the character of the
offender, and the protection of the public interest. See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App.
1982).
Courts are required to consider mitigating evidence in favor of the defendant at
sentencing. See State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460 (2002) (noting that when reviewing a
sentence, Idaho's appellate courts will "review the record on appeal, having due regard for the
nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of the public interest")
(emphasis added); Oliver, 144 Idaho at 726 (same); see also State v. Dallas, 109 Idaho 670, 675
(1985) ("Once a criminal defendant's guilt has been established, the trial judge is under a duty to
tailor the sentence to the individual defendant") (emphasis added). A defendant is "entitled to
have the court consider all these facts in exercising its discretion." State v. Mitchell, 77 Idaho
115, 118-19 (1955) (finding error where the district court based a sentence solely on the fmdings
of the jury without considering any mitigating evidence). "Even where the district court
appropriately understands its discretion and sentences a defendant according to the applicable
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legal principles, an unreasonably excessive sentence can still be an abuse of discretion, and this
Court can reduce the sentence." State v. Miller, 151 Idaho 828, 835 (2011).

C.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Did Not Adequately Consider All
Mitigating Evidence About Mr. Rojas's Mental Health Or Acceptance Of Responsibility
Mr. Rojas submits that, given any view of the facts, the district court did not exercise

reason, and thus abused its discretion, when it imposed a unified sentence of five years, with two
years fixed. Courts are required to consider mitigating evidence in favor of the defendant at
sentencing. See Strand, 137 Idaho at 460; Oliver, 144 Idaho at 726. Specifically, Mr. Rojas
asserts the district court abused its discretion by not adequately considering mitigating evidence
"in favor of avoiding a sentence of imprisonment" concerning his mental health or acceptance of

responsibility. LC. § 19-2521(2).
A court is required to consider a defendant's mental health before imposing a sentence or
revoking probation. State v. Odiaga, 125 Idaho 384, 391 (1994) ("Idaho Code § 19-2523, which
requires that the trial court consider the defendant's mental illness as a sentencing factor, was an
integral part of the legislature's repeal of mental condition as a defense.").
Here, the court did not order a new PSI as one had been completed recently. (Tr., p.15,
L.22 - p.16, L.15.) Accordingly, a mental health evaluation was not completed for purposes of
sentencing in this case. (PSI, p.272.)3 The current PSI did not mention any concerns with
Mr. Rojas's mental health, and no PSI more recent that 2010 was available for the file review
investigator to review. (See PSI, p.273.) However, in the documents that were reviewed as part
of the file review investigation, there were a number of references to significant mental health
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Citations to the presentence investigation report ("PSI") will be to the electronic file labeled
"ConfDocs.-Rojas - CR0l-19-31772.pdf' in Docket No. 47552, as the entire file included in
Docket No. 47585 repeats the last 195 pages of that file.
5

concerns with Mr. Rojas that should have served as mitigating evidence for Mr. Rojas had they
been adequately evaluated.
For example, in the 2010 PSI, the investigator disclosed that, "Roberto had the aid ofIEP
(individualized education plan) throughout his school years. His mother previously told evaluator
Hammari that Roberto did not talk until he was six. In 1998, his IQ was 80; in 2001, it was 75,
per Mr. Hammari's 2006 report." (PSI, p.300.) That evaluator also discussed, in depth, mental
health issues with Mr. Rojas, including him being admitted to Intermountain Hospital for almost
two weeks at age 13 and being diagnosed with "Conduct Disorder, rule out ADHD, and Mood
Disorder, likely a major depression, rule out dysthymia, 4 doubt Bipolar Disorder." (PSI, p.301.)
Six months later, he was readmitted after telling his probation officer "he was going to commit
suicide." (PSI, p.301.) The 2010 PSI investigator further stated that, due to his mental health
concerns, Mr. Rojas "had been prescribed numerous medications in the past, i.e., Abilify,
Adderall, Celexa, Lexapro, Risperdal, Seroquel, Trazadone, Trileptal, Wellbutrin, and Zyprexa."
(PSI, p.302.)

The 2010 PSI investigator also described a multi-year series of hospitalizations and
juvenile incarcerations for Mr. Rojas, all related to his mental health issues. (See PSI, pp.30102.) During that time, Mr. Rojas attempted to commit suicide multiple times. When he was
thirteen, Mr. Rojas's mother informed his probation officer he had "tried to strangle himself with
a fly swatter and had seen the devil." (PSI, p.301.) A year later, he tried to slash his wrists with a
razor which led to a thirteen-day hospitalization. (PSI, p.301.) Just over two years later,

4

"Persistent depressive disorder, also called dysthymia (dis-THIE-me-uh), is a continuous longterm (chronic) form of depression." Persistent depressive disorder (dysthymia), Mayo Clinic,
https://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/persistent-depressive-disorder/symptomscauses/syc-20350929 (last visited April 21, 2020).
6

Mr. Rojas told another evaluator "he had heard the devil's voice instruct him to hang himself."
(PSI, p.301.) However, the 2010 PSI investigator said,
Despite his diagnoses of Bipolar, Conduct, and Mood Disorders, as well as
Dysthymia, and an admitted history of anger problems, [Mr. Rojas] does not want
any mental health counseling at this juncture. In the past, he had been prescribed a
multitude of medication to address his mental health needs. I would submit, once
he is discharged from custody, a Mental Health Evaluation would be beneficial.
(PSI, p.304; see also p.302 (reporting that Mr. Rojas refused to take prescribed medications for
depression and did not "want any mental health counseling").)
At sentencing, counsel for Mr. Rojas asked that the court retain jurisdiction "so that he
can better himself, tum his life around." (Tr., p.20, Ls.13-16.) Mr. Rojas asked for the court to
retain jurisdiction "so I can fix my criminal thinking patterns [because] it's just the same cycle
for me over and over again." (Tr., p.21, Ls.13-19.) But Mr. Rojas was not given the opportunity
for the court to evaluate his "receptiveness to rehabilitation or probation." State v. Petersen, 149
Idaho 808, 812 (Ct. App. 2010) ("The principal purpose ofretainedjurisdiction is to evaluate the
defendant for his or her receptiveness to rehabilitation or probation.") (citing State v. Diggie, 140
Idaho 238, 240 (Ct. App. 2004)). Mr. Rojas acknowledges that the court stated it had reviewed
the PSI. (Tr., p.17, Ls.18-19 ("I ordered a file review PSI, which I have reviewed."); p.22, Ls.1011 ("I've reviewed and considered the PSI materials.").) However, Mr. Rojas submits that,
despite the very specific information available in the PSI concerning his mental health and his
request for rehabilitation, the district court did not adequately consider his mental health before
imposing sentence.
Acceptance of responsibility is another mitigating factor that should be considered by a
court at sentencing. See Jackson, 130 Idaho at 295-96 (finding a fixed-life sentence excessive for
reasons that included the fact that the defendant "took full responsibility for his actions, and did
not blame the victims in any way"); State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 594 (1982) (reducing the
7

defendant's sentence, in part, because "the defendant has accepted responsibility for his acts");

State v. Carrasco, 114 Idaho 348, 354-55 (Ct. App.1988) (apparently treating as mitigation the
fact that the defendant "acknowledged the wrongfulness of the transaction [drug sale] and he
openly expressed contrition for his acts"), reversed on other grounds, 117 Idaho 295 (1990)).
Here, counsel for Mr. Rojas told the court that when he plead guilty, "[ it was] probably
the most honest, straightforward, no-holds-barred plea allocution I've heard over my career.
Mr. Rojas takes full responsibility for his actions." (Tr., p.20, Ls.1-5.) What counsel referred to
was Mr. Rojas's answer to the court questioning him about why he was guilty of the offenses
during the change of plea hearing:
Q. All right. Would you, if you want to plead guilty, tell me what you did to make
you guilty as to these crimes.
A. On the date that the alleged crime happened, I used methamphetamines with a
needle, and that was during the high speed chase. I pulled off to the shoulder, and
I was under the influence. When the deputies lit me up and I know that they didn't
pursue me, then I proceeded to get onto the road, and that's when deputies started
pursuing me again. That's the DUI portion. I was under the influence that day.
And when they attempted to pull me over and threw the spikes out, I went over
the spikes and went into oncoming traffic, and I attempted to flee their stop. I
ended up getting apprehended a time later and was still attempting to kind of like
allude the deputies, but they had me cornered so I surrendered. And here in Ada
County. And that's what I'm pleading guilty to.
Q. So you knew the police were trying to stop you and you kept going.
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you go 30 miles an hour or more over the speed limit in trying to do that?
A. Yes, sir, I did that as well. I did anything I could do at the moment to get away
from the deputies, even going onto oncoming traffic, to endanger other people, to
running stop signs. I did all that.
Q. And you did that while you were under the influence of drugs?
A. I did, sir.
(Tr., p.13, L.21 - p.15, L.1.) The court then asked him if he was "pleading guilty just to get it
over even though you think you're innocent or are you pleading guilty because you are guilty?"
(Tr., p.9, Ls.22-24.) Mr. Rojas simply answered, "I'm pleading guilty because I'm guilty."
(Tr., p.9, L.25.) He recognized he had put innocent people in danger due to his actions; and while
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they are not technically victims of his crimes, he referred to them as such when he told the
presentence investigator that he felt "[r]emorseful, empathy for [his] victims, and guilt."

(PSI, p.273.) In the same manner, he told the court he was "empathetic for the victims who
didn't deserve to be put in such type situation." (Tr., p.21, Ls.5-6.) He said he "[came] before the
Court accepting responsibility for [his] actions" and admitted he "did commit a felony crime."
(Tr., p.20, Ls.22-25.) And at the end of his statement to the court at sentencing, while asking for
the court to retain jurisdiction, Mr. Rojas said he was "not coming before the Court looking for a
way out of the time. If the Court feels like a prison term is what suits me, then it will be - I guess
it is what it is." (Tr., p.21, Ls.15-17.) He submits that the court did not adequately consider these
statements as mitigating evidence that he accepted responsibility for his actions.
Accordingly, Mr. Rojas asserts the district court did not adequately consider his
acceptance of responsibility for his actions, nor did it adequately consider how he could begin
rehabilitation of his mental health conditions through a retained jurisdiction. By not adequately
considering those mitigating factors, Mr. Rojas asserts the district court abused its discretion.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Rojas respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it deems
appropriate. Alternatively, he requests that his case be remanded to the district court for a new
sentencing hearing with instructions that the court retain jurisdiction.
DATED this 23 rd day of April, 2020.
/s/ R. Jonathan Shirts
R. JONATHAN SHIRTS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 23 rd day of April, 2018, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF, to be served as follows:
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov

/s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
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